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In December 2021, the Democratic members of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
attempted to use their majority to issue a request for information but
were blocked by the Republican Chair. Although the Democrats
outnumbered the Chair three-to-one, the agency’s General Counsel
declared the move invalid, and the request went unpublished. After
weeks of hostility, the Chair resigned, effectively conceding her
inability to lead the agency. Although governance at the FDIC is now
settled, concern over the Democratic directors’ actions and the Chair’s
resignation have reverberated beyond that singular agency.
Republicans are concerned that the fracas at the FDIC could be
replicated elsewhere—particularly at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, where a Republican chair leads a Democraticmajority Board. But could it?
This essay examines the membership of the FDIC’s Board and the
legal authorities underlying its decision-making to explain how and
why the fracas occurred. It also examines the structure and authorities
governing the Federal Reserve’s decision-making to conclude that not
only is it structurally unlikely that a majority of Federal Reserve
governors would wish to override the Chair, but also, associate
governors lack authority under existing policy and case law to compel
votes on items. However, there is limited case law on the issue and
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imbuing agenda authority solely in multimember agency chairs is
antidemocratic and inconsistent with statutes that bestow policymaking
authority to collective bodies. Accordingly, it is conceivable that a court
could create new legal doctrines were associate governors to take the
unprecedented step of suing the Chair.

INTRODUCTION
In December 2021, the Democratic members of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
attempted to use their majority to issue a request for information (RFI)
on bank mergers1 but were blocked by Republican Chair Jelena
McWilliams.2 The Democrats outnumbered Chair McWilliams threeto-one, but, because agency staff report to the Chair, the Chair dictates
meeting agendas, and the Chair decides which potential agency actions
receive a vote, the FDIC’s General Counsel declared the move invalid
and refused to allow the request to be published in the Federal
Register.3
Reactions to these events were described by the left and the right
in starkly different terms. On the right, two Republican senators called
the Democrats’ actions a “publicity-seeking attempted coup” and
“illegitimate,”4 and McWilliams, herself, described the Democrats as
“attempt[ing] a hostile takeover of the FDIC internal processes, staff[,]
and board agenda.”5 On the left, McWilliams’s refusal to publish the
RFI was described as an “unprecedented departure from FDIC
tradition”6 and “not only undemocratic but also unlawful.”7 Director

1. Emily Flitter, How Bank Regulators Are Trying to Oust a Trump Holdover, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/business/jelena-mcwilliams-fdic-bank-regu
lation-trump.html [https://perma.cc/JA3P-GQQ8]; Request for Information and Comment on
Rules, Regulations, Guidance, and Statements of Policy Regarding Bank Merger Transactions,
87 Fed. Reg. 18740 (proposed Mar. 31, 2022).
2. Flitter, supra note 1.
3. Id.; Jelena McWilliams, A Hostile Takeover of the FDIC, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2021,
6:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hostile-takeover-fdic-board-rohit-chopra-michael-hsu-jel
ena-mcwilliams-abuse-power-11639432939 [https://perma.cc/Z7UL-9BUL] (“Board members were
immediately notified by the FDIC’s general counsel that the CFPB’s communication didn’t
constitute a valid board distribution and therefore couldn’t be recorded as official board action.”).
4. Flitter, supra note 1.
5. McWilliams, supra note 3.
6. Adam J. Levitin, It’s Time for Biden to Fire the FDIC Chief, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2021,
4:48 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/12/16/biden-fire-fdic-chief-525140 [https
://perma.cc/WE8U-XGHG].
7. Mehrsa Baradaran & Jeremy Kress, Your Pocketbook Is Ruled by This Agency, and It’s
in the Middle of a Huge Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/14/
opinion/jelena-mcwilliams-fdic-bank-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/J2DX-68AD].
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Martin Gruenberg released a statement explaining that “[n]o
individual member of the Board may override the authority of the
majority.”8
The fact that these events were so shocking that articles on the
internal workings of the FDIC were published in major media outlets
is the result of an accidental development. In an effort to streamline
agency processes,9 Congress granted a majority of commission chairs
immense control over their agencies through the combination of
agenda-setting authority (i.e., the privilege of setting meeting agendas
and deciding which items receive votes) and chief-executive authority
(i.e., the privilege of managing agency staff and setting their work
priorities).10 With these two authorities, commission chairs across the
government work with agency staff to decide which enforcement
actions to bring, which applications to approve, and which rules to
write, leaving associate commissioners with little latitude to affect their
agencies’ agendas except for the threat that they will vote against their
chairs’ priorities. An associate commissioner at an agency once noted
that his “chairman and a handful of staff—usually selected by the
chair—can and usually do exercise nearly total control over that
agency’s basic policy agenda.”11 Accordingly, when a majority of the
FDIC’s Board acted to publish a mere RFI opposed by their Chair, it
was newsworthy.
Although the Democrats were unsuccessful in publishing their
RFI at the time, they accomplished an even bigger feat: perhaps having
concluded that she had lost her ability to control the agency,
McWilliams submitted her resignation to President Biden on New

8. @BrendanPedersen, T WITTER (Dec. 9, 2021, 7:19 PM), https://twitter.com/Brendan
Pedersen/status/1469099427088457732 [https://perma.cc/7RJT-UCKZ].
9. See COMM. ON INDEP. REGUL. COMM’NS, A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS:
PREPARED FOR THE COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT 44, 46 – 47 (1949) (finding that “[i]t is very difficult for five or more commissioners
to direct the work of the bureaus, or for the bureau chief to report to five or more masters” and
recommending that “the chairman should be specifically designated as the person responsible for
administration within the commission”); see also 96 CONG. REC. 3239, 3240 (1950) (Message from
the President of the United States) (explaining that proposed reorganization plans would give
several agencies’ chairs responsibility for “the day-to-day direction and internal administration of
the complex staff organizations”).
10. See Todd Phillips, Commission Chairs, 40 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming) (discussing
the extent of commission chairs’ authorities).
11. Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative,
1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 245 n.24 (1988).
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Year’s Eve.12 As of publication, the Board consists of three Democratic
appointees led by Acting Chair Gruenberg, and the RFI was published
on March 31, 2022.13
Concern over the Democratic FDIC directors’ actions and
McWilliams’ subsequent resignation (in whole, “the fracas”)
reverberated beyond that singular agency. In recent hearings for
President Biden’s nominees to the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Republican senators questioned
whether such actions could occur at that agency as well. Questioning
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell during his renomination
hearing, Senator Bill Hagerty asked whether the Federal Reserve is
“vulnerable to similar unfortunate politically motivated hijacking of an
organization like we just witnessed at the FDIC.”14 Questioning
Governor Lael Brainard during her Vice Chair hearing, Senator Pat
Toomey asked if she could explain “how you view the coup,” and
Senator Thom Tillis asked if the Vice Chair position “provides you
with any special power or authority to set Board agenda items.”15 In
Sarah Bloom Raskin’s hearing to be Federal Reserve’s Vice Chair of
Supervision, Senator Hagerty asked whether she “committed to
deferring to the Fed Chairman to set the agenda,” as he did not want a
“coup d’etat like we saw at the FDIC.”16
Senate Republicans were concerned that the fracas at the FDIC
could be replicated at the Federal Reserve. As of publication, the
seven-member Board of Governors has a Democratic majority with a

12. Letter from Jelena McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., President, U.S. (Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2021/pr21107.html
[https://perma.cc/VW8H-ED62] [hereinafter Letter from McWilliams].
13. See About FDIC: Board of Directors & Senior Executives, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/leadership/index.html [https://perma.cc/JBD2-4QTF] (last updated Sept.
12, 2022) (explaining that the Board consists of Martin J. Gruenberg, Michael J. Hsu, and Rohit
Chopra, and Gruenberg serves as Acting Chair); Request for Information and Comment on
Rules, Regulations, Guidance, and Statements of Policy Regarding Bank Merger Transactions,
87 Fed. Reg. 18740 (proposed Mar. 31, 2022).
14. Nomination Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 117th
Cong. (2022), https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/01/04/2022/nomination-hearing [https://perma.cc/
5VL2-WBLC]. As of publication, the transcripts for these hearings have not been made available.
15. Federal Reserve Vice Chair Nomination Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.cspan.org/video/?517105-1/federal-reserve-vice-chair-confirmation-hearing [https://perma.cc/B5BLCYE9].
16. See Nomination Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs.,
117th Cong. (2022), https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/01/25/2022/nomination-hearing
[https://perma.cc/W96R-KFRM]. Raskin responded “Yes, I do, Senator” to committing to defer
to the Chairman. Id.
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Republican Chair, and Chair Jerome Powell’s values and priorities
may not be shared by the Board’s majority for the duration of his term.
But could a fracas like that which transpired at the FDIC similarly
occur at the Federal Reserve? Is the federal agency with the largest say
over the national economy at risk of a coup, putsch, revolt, or
revolution by associate governors?
The answer is likely “no”—at least not without unprecedented
litigation and the creation of new, groundbreaking case law. This paper
comes to this conclusion in two parts. Part I explains the details of the
fracas, its impetus, and the legal mechanisms used by the Democratic
FDIC directors. Part II explains the current law and policy governing
decision-making at the Federal Reserve and why attempts by associate
governors to wrest agenda control from the Chair are unlikely to be
attempted and would likely fail if tried. Finally, Part II also explains
that, although the case law on commission governance as it stands
today is unlikely to support a motion by associate governors to force a
vote, a court may find it equitable to create new case law permitting
such a vote.
I. THE FRACAS AT THE FDIC: WHAT, WHY, AND HOW
A. Background on the FDIC’s Abnormal Governance Structure
The fracas at the FDIC came about because of the FDIC’s
abnormal governance structure. The FDIC is led by a five-member
Board of Directors of which no more than three may be of one political
party.17 The Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) are ex officio members
of the Board and are considered “outside” directors.18 Three “inside”
directors are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
to six-year terms, one of which is confirmed by the Senate to the
position of Chair for a five-year term.19 At the time the fracas occurred,
the FDIC’s bylaws stated that the Chair “shall manage and direct the
daily executive and administrative functions and operations of the
Corporation and shall otherwise have the general powers and duties
usually vested in the office of the chief executive officer of a
corporation.”20 In practice, all FDIC staff report up to the Chair.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a).
18. See id. § 1812(a)(1).
19. See id. § 1812(a)–(c).
20. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS, ART. VI § 4. (2019) (available at https://web.
archive.org/web/20220119061659/https://www.fdic.gov/about/governance/bylaws.pdf [https://per
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This structure, despite changes over time, worked well for the first
88 years of the FDIC’s existence. Like the other financial regulators,
the FDIC is considered an “independent regulatory agency,”21 and its
membership has been largely free from presidential interference: it has
been presumed that the FDIC’s three inside directors may not be fired
by the President except for cause,22 and, before 2020, the CFPB
Director had explicit for-cause removal protection.23 No Senateconfirmed FDIC director (inside or outside) has ever been removed
from office by the President. The governance of the FDIC was stable.
The change in tenor at the FDIC arose because of politics and
litigation involving the CFPB. Conservatives abhorred the CFPB
following its creation in 2010 (for reasons including that it maintained
extensive legal authorities and that, rather than being run by a multimember commission, it was run by a single Director with a five-year
term and for-cause removal protections)24 and waged a “bruising, bareknuckle, decade-long fight” to weaken its authority,25 restructure its
governance,26 and abolish it entirely.27 President Trump further
politicized the CFPB by naming Mick Mulvaney—who had called the
CFPB “a joke . . . in a sick, sad kind of way”28 while in Congress and
ma.cc/S7TZ-LFZM]). This article discusses the 2019 bylaws, since those are what applied from
late 2021 and early 2022 (the timeframe of the events in this Article). The bylaws have been
updated since then. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS (2022) (available at https://www.fdic.
gov/about/governance/bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2UN-D4AF]) (providing that the bylaws
were “adopted by the Board of Directors on October 18, 2022”). Subsequent bylaws changes do
not affect the analysis in this article.
21. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5).
22. The statute governing the FDIC is silent as to whether or how the President may remove
any of the Directors. However, the FDIC is similar in many ways to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the commissioners of which the Supreme Court presumed to be protected against
removal except for “‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” See Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010) (citation omitted); see also Calcutt v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 37 F.4th 293, 303 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he parties agree that [the FDIC’s
internal directors] are not removable at will.”).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (“The President may remove the Director for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
24. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 336–43 (2013) (describing various rationales given for opposing the
governance structure of the CFPB and the CFPB as an institution).
25. Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV.
352, 353 (2020); see also Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543, 2567–2572 (2019) (describing
the various assaults on the CFPB’s structure).
26. Id.
27. See S. 370, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1031, 115th Cong. (2017).
28. Credit Union Times, Rep. Mick Mulvaney: CFPB ‘Sick, Sad Joke’, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RaVeNafdyVA [https://perma.cc/W6A9-KKFW].
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had co-sponsored legislation to eliminate the agency29—as Acting
Director while he simultaneously served as Director of the Office of
Management and Budget.30 According to Professor Adam Levitin,
having Mulvaney “work[] double-duty as OMB director (serving at the
pleasure of the president) and Acting CFPB director (nominally
independent) showed that Republicans had little regard for the
[CFPB’s] independence when it was inconvenient.”31
Conservatives also litigated the CFPB’s structure, resulting in the
Seila Law v. CFPB32 decision—the true catalyst of the FDIC fracas. In
Seila Law, the Supreme Court declared that the CFPB’s governance
structure—“leadership by a single individual removable only for
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance[—]violates the separation of
powers” requirements of the U.S. Constitution.33 The Court severed
“the Director’s removal protection . . . from the other provisions of
Dodd-Frank that establish the CFPB,” leaving the CFPB Director
removable at-will by the President.34 Seila Law also reaffirmed the
President’s ability to “remove the Comptroller [of the Currency] for
any reason.”35
Accordingly, from President Biden onward, it is likely that new
administrations will replace the prior President’s CFPB Director and
Comptroller on their first day in office, and these officials’ partisan
affiliations will change with the President’s. Because of the FDIC
Board’s partisanship requirement, when these two officials’ party
affiliation changes it is likely that the FDIC Board’s majority party
changes as well.36 The table below shows what happened when
President Biden succeeded President Trump.37
29. See H.R. 3118, 114th Cong. (2015).
30. See Levitin, supra note 6.
31. Id.
32. Seila Law v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
33. See id. at 2197.
34. Id. at 2211.
35. Id. at 2201, n.5.
36. The only way that change would not happen is if a President had a CFPB Director and
Comptroller who were of a different party than the three inside directors. This could potentially
happen: a Republican President could have three Republican inside directors and a Democratic
or registered Independent CFPB Director and Comptroller. However, Congress would have to
approve three inside directors of the same party, which could be difficult. Frequently, Congress
moves nominees for multi-member agencies in pairs (i.e., one Republican and one Democrat).
See generally Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 9 (2018) (discussing the politics of agency partisan balance requirements).
37. See About FDIC: Board of Directors & Senior Executives, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20210120165920/https://www.fdic.gov/about/leadership/index.html
[https://perma.cc/N2ZT-TKAY] (last updated Jan. 14, 2021) (noting that Jelena McWilliams was
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FDIC Position
Inside Director (Chair)
Inside Director
Inside Director
Comptroller
CFPB Director

Trump (Republican)
Republican
Democrat
Vacant
Republican
Republican
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Biden (Democrat)
Republican
Democrat
Vacant
Democrat
Democrat

Following Seila Law, three of the four banking agencies are likely
to change parties when the presidency does—the CFPB, OCC, and
FDIC will flip while the Federal Reserve will not. Consequently, it is
no stretch to say that Seila Law opened the floodgates to the
politicization of the federal banking regulators; “[t]he new reality is
that bank regulation is an ugly, partisan blood sport.”38
B. A Narrative of the Fracas
While the fracas may or may not have been ugly, it certainly was
partisan and ideological. From public information, a timeline of events
can be compiled that shows how this partisan power struggle fomented
and intensified.
On October 31, 2021, less than three weeks after he was sworn into
office,39 CFPB Director Rohit Chopra presented the FDIC’s Board
with an initial draft of the bank mergers RFI, with the intention that

Chair; the Vice Chair position was vacant; Martin J. Gruenberg was an inside director; Blake
Paulson was Acting Comptroller of the Currency; and Kathleen Laura Kraninger was CFPB
Director); Brian P. Brooks to Step Down, Blake Paulson to Become Acting Comptroller of the
Currency on January 14, 2021, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.occ.
gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2021/nr-occ-2021-7.html [https://perma.cc/V3VP-GYBP] (identifying
Paulson as Acting Comptroller during the Trump Administration); Sylvan Lane, Consumer
Bureau Director Resigns After Biden’s Inauguration, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2021 1:33 PM), https://the
hill.com/policy/finance/535053-consumer-bureau-director-resigns-after-bidens-inauguration [htt
ps://perma.cc/4TXK-4RKC] (identifying Kraninger as a Republican); About FDIC: Board of
Directors & Senior Executives, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://web.archive.org/web/2021110214
5527/https://www.fdic.gov/about/leadership/index.html [https://perma.cc/ECC7-5FNY] (last updated
Oct. 20, 2021) (noting that Jelena McWilliams was Chair; the Vice Chair position was vacant;
Martin J. Gruenberg was an inside director; Rohit Chopra was CFPB Director; and Michael J.
Hsu was Acting Comptroller of the Currency); Flitter, supra note 1 (identifying McWilliams as a
Republican and Gruenberg, Chopra, and Hsu as Democrats).
38. Levitin, supra note 6.
39. See Rohit Chopra, The CFPB Is Looking Out For Families, Workers, and Communities,
CFPB (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/the-cfpb-is-looking-outfor-families-workers-and-communities [https://perma.cc/CJL8-CD75] (“Today, I was sworn in as
Director of the CFPB.”).
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the RFI be a joint release between the FDIC and OCC.40 After sitting
on the draft for two weeks, Chair McWilliams informed Chopra and
the other directors that FDIC staff would draft an alternate RFI that
would be available within three weeks, or “no later than Dec[ember]
6.”41 Just over an hour later, the Democratic directors instructed FDIC
staff to provide technical assistance to Chopra’s initial document
instead.42 Despite the joint request, the Executive Secretary refused to
circulate the document to FDIC staff, and two days later the
Democratic directors “made a direct request to the heads of [three
FDIC divisions] and the General Counsel to directly solicit staff input,”
but received no comments.43 Following Chair McWilliams’ direction,
FDIC staff began drafting their own document.44
After receiving no technical assistance from FDIC staff, Chopra’s
deputy sent an email calling a vote on the initial draft, claiming the vote
was open between November 26 and December 6—the day by which
McWilliams had promised FDIC staff would produce an alternate
proposal.45 Later that day, the FDIC’s General Counsel determined
and notified the Board that “the communication . . . [did not]
constitute a valid circulation of a notational vote and [could not] be
recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board of Directors”
on the basis that “[t]he Bylaws of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation do not confer authority to an individual Board member to
circulate an item for notational vote”; rather, that authority “rests with
the Executive Secretary under the supervision of the General Counsel
and at the direction of the Chairman.”46 Chopra later described the

40. See McWilliams, supra note 3; Statement of Rohit Chopra, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, Member, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Bd. of Dirs., December Open Meeting of the Board
(Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/statement-of-cfpb-direct
or-rohit-chopra-member-fdic-board-of-directors-december-open-meeting-of-the-board [https://
perma.cc/55BN-ZFTD].
41. McWilliams, supra note 3.
42. See McWilliams, supra note 3 (“Seventy-five minutes later, the [Democratic] directors
sent a joint letter instructing FDIC staff to mark up their original document instead.”); Statement
of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40 (noting that the three directors “ask[ed] the FDIC’s Executive
Secretary to circulate the draft to key divisions of the agency for technical and legal review”).
Importantly, whoever controls the pen on a document gets to set the tone for that document, and
any responses must be made on their terms.
43. Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40.
44. McWilliams, supra note 3.
45. Id.; Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40.
46. Letter from Nicholas Podsiadly, Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Rohit Chopra,
Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Nov. 26, 2021), https://www.fdic.gov/foia/files/fdicboardgovern
anceandbylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR8Y-RNNB].
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General Counsel’s legal reasoning as “frivolous” and made “without
any factual basis or legal citation.”47
Despite the claim made by the FDIC’s General Counsel that the
vote was illegitimate, the three Democratic directors all voted
electronically on the CFPB’s document.48 Chopra later wrote that he
“anticipated that the Chairperson would redirect the matter to a Board
meeting,” as would be her right under the bylaws, “which would at least
guarantee discussion and a path to resolution.”49 Because McWilliams
did not vote, the result was 3-0 in favor of the CFPB’s document.50
As McWilliams promised, FDIC staff delivered to the Board an
alternate RFI on December 6.51 McWilliams would later describe this
document as “factual and neutral in tone, informed by the expertise of
career staff—a genuine effort to solicit public feedback without
politicizing the agency or the process,”52 whereas Chopra and another
CFPB official would describe the document as “wholly unacceptable,”
“gutted,” and “clearly a tactic to delay action.”53 Along with the
alternate RFI, the General Counsel sent a letter to the directors
reiterating the assertion that authority to circulate an item for
notational vote “rests solely with the Executive Secretary under the
supervision of the General Counsel at the direction of the Chairman.”54
Chopra later described the General Counsel’s assertion as implying
that “the Chairperson has total control over the FDIC, not the Board

47. Letter from Rohit Chopra, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Nicholas Podsiadly,
Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 7, 2021) [hereinafter Letter from Chopra to Podsiadly]
(on file with author). The assertion provided by the General Counsel has been redacted.
48. See McWilliams, supra note 3 (“Within hours of receiving that document, board
members responded by attempting to vote on the original CFPB document. Board member
Martin Gruenberg, a former chairman, electronically signed his alleged vote on Dec. 3, three days
before receiving the FDIC document for review.”).
49. Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40; see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS,
ART. IV § 6(g) (2019) (providing for notational voting “unless any one member of the Board of
Directors provides written notice to the Executive Secretary of his or her request to transact said
business at a meeting of the Board of Directors”).
50. Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40.
51. McWilliams, supra note 3.
52. McWilliams, supra note 3.
53. Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40; Kate Davidson and Aubree Eliza Weaver,
FDIC Revolt on Bank Rule Sparks Deeper Governance Questions, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2021, 8:00
AM), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-money/2021/12/13/fdic-revolt-on-bank-rulesparks-deeper-governance-questions-799432 [https://perma.cc/5S9Z-SLCQ].
54. Letter from Nicholas Podsiadly, Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Dirs., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.fdic.gov/foia/files/fdicboardgovernanceandbylaws.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KR8Y-RNNB].
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created by Congress and composed of members appointed by the
President.”55
Chopra the next day replied to the General Counsel with a
memorandum detailing the legal authorities for the vote called by his
deputy,56 and, on December 9, the CFPB published on its website the
RFI and a joint statement by Gruenberg and Chopra.57 The joint
statement noted that the Board “instruct[ed] the Executive Secretary
to record the vote in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board and
authorize[d] the Executive Secretary to transmit the Request for
Information to the Federal Register for publication.”58 It was
publication of this document—specifically on the CFPB’s website—
that caught the public’s attention that something of significance was
occurring inside the FDIC.59
The FDIC Board held a previously scheduled public meeting the
next week that included, among other items, a vote to approve a
summary agenda that recorded the votes of actions taken by notational
vote between that meeting and the one prior.60 Chopra noted that the
summary agenda did not include the vote taken on the RFI and made

55. Letter from Chopra to Podsiadly, supra note 47.
56. See Memorandum from Rohit Chopra, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Nicholas
Podsiadly, Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Authority of FDIC Board, Particularly with
Respect to Written Voting (Dec. 7, 2021) [hereinafter CFPB Memo] (on file with author) (arguing
that “under the FDIC bylaws, the Board of Directors clearly may vote by writing on FDIC
business, and the circulation and recognition of such voting is not under the control of the FDIC
Chairperson, General Counsel, or Executive Secretary”).
57. See Jesse Hamilton, U.S. Bank Regulators Tussle Over Effort to Scrutinize Mergers,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2021 12:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-10/us-bank-regulators-tussle-over-effort-to-scrutinize-mergers [https://perma.cc/8TBL-KCNQ] (noting
“a review of bank-merger policies [was] announced on the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau website by FDIC directors”); see also Joint Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg & Rohit
Chopra, Members, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp. Bd. of Dirs., Request for Public Comment on the
Bank Merger Act (Dec. 9, 2021), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_bankmerger-act-rfi_joint-statement_2021-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCE2-WSVY].
58. Joint Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg & Rohit Chopra, supra note 57, at 1, n.1.
59. See, e.g., @BrendanPedersen, TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2021, 4:11 PM), https://twitter.com/
BrendanPedersen/status/1469052060452728832 [https://perma.cc/2BN6-BBV8]; @byclairew, TWITTER
(Dec. 9, 2021, 4:15 PM), https://twitter.com/byclairew/status/1469053172387876868 [https://perma.cc/
V3AP-WWUD].
60. Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Dec. 14, 2021), http://fdic.windrosemedia.com/index.php?category=FDIC
+Board+Meetings [https://perma.cc/GL78-FZMK] (FDIC Board Meeting on Dec. 14, 2021).

2022]

THE FRACAS AT THE FDIC

69

a motion to include it.61 McWilliams rejected that movement as out of
order and did not allow a vote to take place.62
The day after the public meeting, McWilliams published an
editorial in the Wall Street Journal laying out her perspective on the
fracas. In her first public statement about the events, she portrayed the
“episode [as] an attempt to wrest control from an independent agency’s
chairman with a change in the administration” and “an example of the
erosion of America’s democracy.”63
Finally, on December 31, McWilliams submitted a letter of
resignation to President Biden.64
Throughout, members of Congress attempted to influence the
course of events. The day the fracas exploded into public view, Senator
Pat Toomey, the top Republican on the Senate Banking Committee,
called the event a “failed, publicity-seeking attempted coup” that
“undermines the independence and integrity of the FDIC”; “a radical
politicization of a long-respected financial regulator”; an
“unprecedented, illegitimate attempt to depose a bona fide and
Senate-confirmed chairman”; and an “unlawful attempt to
circumvent” McWilliams.65 Later, three top Republicans on the House
Financial Services Committee declared Chopra’s “attempt to bypass
the Chairman and set the agency’s agenda [a]s illegitimate,” an
“attempt to co-opt the authority of the Chairman,” and an effort to
“upend the FDIC’s 88-year tradition of considering the Chairman’s
agenda on a collegial basis and independent from the White House’s
influence.”66 And, the Democratic Chair of the House Financial
Services Committee, Maxine Waters, asked McWilliams to “promptly
cite the legal authority and provide any legal analysis that you are

61. Id. (statement of Rohit Chopra).
62. See id. (Statement of McWilliams: “these actions did not constitute a valid circulation of
a notational vote and therefore the document cannot be added to the minutes.” Statement of
Chopra: “Are you ruling my motion out of order?” Statement of McWilliams: “Yes, I am.”).
63. McWilliams, supra note 3.
64. Letter from McWilliams, supra note 12.
65. Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., Toomey Statement on
Chopra’s Illegitimate FDIC Coup (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/
minority/toomey-statement-on-chopras-illegitimate-fdic-coup [https://perma.cc/NB5P-DEQ5].
66. Letter from Patrick McHenry, Tom Emmer, and Blaine Luetkemeyer, Ranking
Members, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs. to Rohit Chopra, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Dec.
14, 2021), https://republicansfinancialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2012-14-12_final_pmc_bl_
te_to_chopra_-_fdic_doc_preservation_request.pdf [https://perma.cc/YW9N-5B6U].

70

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 72:58

relying on in your attempt to unilaterally block the will of the majority
of the FDIC Board to carry out the agency’s responsibilities.”67
C. The Democratic Directors Acted Pursuant to Legal Authority
An analysis shows that the Democratic directors acted pursuant to
legal authority and that their directives must be executed by the
agency’s chief executive officer and staff, and the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), in a recent opinion, agrees.68 The FDIC’s organic
statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), combined with
Supreme Court precedent, allows a Board majority to act on behalf of
the FDIC; the FDIC’s bylaws allow that majority to act by written vote
without items first being circulated by the Chair or Executive
Secretary; and the bylaws require staff to effectuate the Board’s
directives.
The FDI Act provides that “[t]he management of the Corporation
shall be vested in a Board of Directors . . . .”69 It also provides the
FDIC’s ten enumerated corporate powers that, among others, allow
the Board to “exercise . . . all powers specifically granted by the
provisions of this chapter, and such incidental powers as shall be
necessary” to “prescribe . . . bylaws not inconsistent with law,
regulating the manner in which its general business may be conducted,
and the privileges granted to it by law may be exercised and enjoyed”
and to “prescribe . . . such rules and regulations as it may deem
necessary to carry out” its legal responsibilities.70 Further, although
there are several FDI Act provisions that give the Chair certain limited
responsibilities over discrete bank regulation functions,71 there is
nothing in the FDI Act that allows the Chair management or executive
authority over the agency, let alone the ability to stop the Board from

67. Letter from Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs. to Jelena
McWilliams, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., (Dec. 21, 2021), https://financialservices.house.
gov/uploadedfiles/1221_-_waters_ltrto_fdic_bank_merger_rfi.pdf [https://perma.cc/28MJ-3RZL].
68. See Auth. of a Majority of the FDIC Bd. to Present Items for Vote and Decision, 46 Op.
O.L.C. 1, 1 (2022) [hereinafter OLC FDIC Opinion].
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1); see also id. § 1820(a) (“The Board of Directors shall administer
the affairs of the Corporation fairly and impartially and without discrimination.”).
70. Id. § 1819.
71. See, e.g., id. §§ 1820(k)(5), 1831z(b), 1834a(d)(2)(C), 1831o(h)(3)(C)(ii); see also CFPB
Memo, supra note 56, at 5 (“[T]he other references to the Chairperson in the FDI Act also cannot
plausibly be viewed as contradicting those provisions [vesting authority in the Board], as the other
references do not provide the Chairperson with administrative, executive, or managerial authority
over the Corporation.”).
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making management decisions.72 In sum, the FDI Act provides the
FDIC Directors with inherent authority to make policy decisions on
behalf of the agency.73
A prior Supreme Court decision explains what is necessary for
multimember agencies to make use of their statutory authorities. In
FTC v. Flotill Products, the Court declared that “[t]he almost
universally accepted common-law rule is . . . [that] in the absence of a
contrary statutory provision, a majority of a quorum constituted of a
simple majority of a collective body is empowered to act for the
body.”74 In that case, three of four sitting FTC commissioners voted on
whether the defendant had violated a provision of law, and two of those
three found that it had.75 The Court upheld the decision of the two
commissioners; in instances in which a multi-member agency’s
“enabling statute is silent on the question [of how many members is
required to take action on behalf of an agency], the body is justified in
adhering to that common-law rule.”76
However, the FDI Act and Supreme Court precedent are alone
insufficient to determine when or how the FDIC’s Board may act, as
the Board’s bylaws governed its activities and must be considered.77
These bylaws provided explicit authority for the three Democratic
directors’ action: they stated that “[r]egular meetings of the Board of
Directors shall be held at such times as the Chairperson shall direct,”
but they also provided two additional avenues by which associate

72. See OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 3 (“The Act, however, is perfectly clear that
the Board, not the Chairperson, has the authority to determine how the FDIC should exercise its
substantive powers, as well as the authority to prescribe procedures for making such substantive
decisions—an ‘incidental power[] . . . necessary to carry out the powers so granted.’”) (quoting 12
U.S.C. § 1819(a)); see also CFPB Memo, supra note 56, at 4 (“[T]here is no indication in the FDI
Act that the Chairperson, General Counsel, or Executive Secretary has the authority to prevent
the majority of the FDIC Board from making decisions for the Corporation.”). The CFPB Memo
notes that although the FDI Act provides that one inside director “shall be designated by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve as Chairperson of the Board
of Directors,” this provision “gives no indication of contradicting the provisions cited above that
state that the management of the Corporation is vested in the Board itself.” Id. at 5.
73. See OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 3 (noting, for example, that “[t]he Board
could not exercise its power to impose reporting requirements on insured depository
institutions . . . without first presenting such action to the Board for a vote and decision”).
74. FTC v. Flotill Products, 389 U.S. 179, 183 (1967).
75. Id. at 180.
76. Id. at 183–84.
77. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS (governing the activities of the FDIC’s
Board of Directors).
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directors may induce votes on matters upon which the Chair refuses to
hold votes.78
First, the bylaws provided that “[s]pecial meetings of the Board of
Directors may be called by the Chairperson or, upon the written
request of any two members of the Board of Directors, by the
Executive Secretary.”79 Second, Article IV Section 6(g) of the bylaws
provided a process for notational or written voting. It read in full:
The Board of Directors may transact business by the circulation of
written items to all members of the Board of Directors who can be
contacted after a reasonable effort and in sufficient time to permit
action where a majority of the members participate, in writing, in the
disposition of each item of business and where such disposition,
including the vote of each member with respect to each item of
business, is recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board
of Directors, unless any one member of the Board of Directors
provides written notice to the Executive Secretary of his or her
request to transact said business at a meeting of the Board of
Directors.80

The FDIC’s Democrats used this notational voting process to
approve the RFI,81 and they appear to have followed the bylaws’ text
to the letter, at least as best they could with an intransigent Executive
Secretary. There are some facts that are not public, but it is clear that
Chopra’s deputy circulated the document by email to all directors,
including McWilliams, and a majority of directors participated in
writing.82 The disposition appears to have not been recorded in the
minutes of the proceedings, but that is a record kept by the Executive
Secretary, not any of the directors. Although the Executive Secretary
may have historically been the circulator of documents for notational
voting, which appears to be the implication from the General Counsel’s

78. Id. at ART. IV, § 6(a) (2019). OLC notes that this authority and the authority of the Chair
to preside at meetings, “together have been understood within the FDIC to authorize the
Chairperson to set the agendas for Board meetings. But neither delegation—nor the inferred
authority to set agendas—speaks to the power to block a Board majority from voting to consider
an additional item of business or, in the absence of a meeting, from circulating an item for a
written vote of the Board.” OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 6 (citations omitted).
79. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS, ART. IV, § 6(b) (2019).
80. Id. at ART. IV, § 6(g).
81. See Statement of Rohit Chopra, supra note 40 (detailing a series of events leading to a
vote, including the “anticipat[ion] that the Chairperson would redirect the matter to a Board
meeting,” that align with the procedures of article IV section 6(g) of the FDIC Bylaws).
82. See McWilliams, supra note 3 (“Within hours of receiving that document, board
members responded by attempting to vote on the original CFPB document.”).
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statement that an email did not constitute a valid board distribution,83
the bylaws contain no such requirement.
Finally, it is clear that the RFI should have been published in the
Federal Register by FDIC staff (and, following McWilliams’
resignation, it was).84 The bylaws provided that “[t]he General Counsel
shall . . . render all legal services necessary to enable the Board of
Directors and the Corporation’s various organizational units to
discharge their respective duties and responsibilities” and “shall also
be responsible for performing or overseeing the duties of the secretary
of the Board of Directors of the Corporation.”85 As the Executive
Secretary received a valid directive from the Board to act, the General
Counsel was responsible for ensuring the directive was fulfilled.
Beyond the dictates of the bylaws, FDIC staff—like all federal
employee staff—must “‘faithfully discharge the duties of the office[s]’”
they hold.86
Were a court to review the Democratic directors’ activities as
described above, this author expects the vote would be found valid.87
83. See Letter from Nicholas Podsiadly, Gen. Couns., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to Dirs., Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 54 (“Director Chopra’s communication dated November 26, 2021,
did not constitute a valid circulation of a notational vote, subsequent responses do not constitute
valid votes, and neither can be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the Board of
Directors.”).
84. See Request for Information and Comment on Rules, Regulations, Guidance, and
Statements of Policy Regarding Bank Merger Transactions, 87 Fed. Reg. 18740 (proposed Mar.
31, 2022).
85. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BYLAWS, ART. VI § 4(k) (2019).
86. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331; see also Mark R. Rutgers, The Oath of Office as Public Value
Guardian, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 428, 428 (2010) (“The oath of office establishes a moral
commitment to the office that transcends a contractual, managerial, and/or legal approach to
public authority.”).
To support the proposition “that the instructions of the FDIC Board of Directors must be
implemented by the Corporation’s officers,” see CFPB Memo, supra note 56, at 10, the CFPB
Memo posits that the principles of corporate law, as applied to federal agencies, require FDIC
staff to effectuate the Board majority’s actions. Because the FDIC is a corporation, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811(a), the memo argues that it is “appropriate to look to the law of corporations in
interpreting the FDI Act.” See id. at 9. The memo cites Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., which held that “Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states.” 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)). Then, the memo quotes several state court opinions that provide that “[a] chief executive
office . . . may not act in a manner contrary to the express desires of the board of directors” and
that “officers have a duty to comply with the board’s directives.” See Amalgamated Bank v.
Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752., 781 (Del. Ch. 2016); Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v.
Amerisourcebergen Corp., No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 WL 132752, at *21 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020),
aff’d on other grounds, 243 A.3d 417 (Del. 2020).
87. In the alternative, rather than suing, the three Democratic directors could have
encouraged the President to remove McWilliams from office. Unlike some other statutes, the FDI
Act does not provide for-cause removal protections for agency officials. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41
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Even as the Democratic directors followed the bylaws as best they
could to vote on the RFI, OLC’s opinion—which the FDIC indicates it
will follow going forward88—provides that “the most natural reading”
of the bylaws is that they “preserv[e] the power of a Board majority to
present items for Board decision and vote,” regardless of the Chair’s
agenda-setting authority.89 OLC notes that as an initial matter,
“[n]othing in the [FDI] Act can be read as authorizing the Chairperson
to prevent a majority of the Board from presenting items to the Board
for a vote and decision,”90 and while such an authorization could be
enacted in the bylaws, none has been. Further, OLC notes that
“[a]lthough the Bylaws do not directly address the authority to present
items to the Board” and that “the Board has historically construed
them . . . to give the Chairperson the authority to set the agenda for
meetings,” this authority “is distinct . . . from the authority to prevent
the Corporation’s Board from voting on FDIC business by unilaterally
blocking Board consideration of certain items entirely.”91 Lastly, OLC
notes that parliamentary procedure provides that “presiding officers
exercise generally ministerial duties that are not understood to include

(providing Federal Trade commissioners protection from removal except for inefficiency, neglect,
and malfeasance in office). According to the Supreme Court, a statute’s failure to provide explicit
removal protections means that no such protections exist. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S.Ct. 1761,
1782 (2021) (“The term [‘independent’] does not necessarily mean that the Agency is
‘independent’ of the President. It may mean instead that the Agency is not part of and is therefore
independent of any other unit of the Federal Government. And describing an agency as
independent would be an odd way to signify that its head is removable only for cause because
even an agency head who is shielded in that way would hardly be fully ‘independent’ of
Presidential control.”). However, academics have provided arguments that would counsel for
finding protections inherent in the statutes. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of
Generalization—PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and
Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2276 (2011) (arguing that agencies created in the period
between Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935), should be read to infer removal protections because Congress may have been
“unwilling to take the risk that if that provision [providing limitations on the president’s removal
power] was found unconstitutional, the result would be to jeopardize the whole scheme” of an
agency regulating some industry); Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions:
Presidential Removal and the Statutory Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(2021) (arguing that a term of years implicitly prohibits removal). However, even if one were to
assume that the three permissions apply to the FDIC, it is plausible, and even likely, that a court
would find that Chair McWilliams’ refusal to publish the RFI constitutes malfeasance.
88. OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 1 n. 1.
89. Id. at 6. OLC also argues that “the Board itself has the prerogative to construe the scope
of its delegations to the Chairperson as falling short of giving the Chairperson the power to
disregard the will of a majority of the Board,” though it is unclear how this construction could
occur if the presiding officer refuses to permit a vote to occur. See id. at 5.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 3–4.

2022]

THE FRACAS AT THE FDIC

75

the authority to defeat the will of the majority”92 and that “[a] presiding
officer cannot arbitrarily defeat the will of the majority by refusing to
entertain or put motions . . . or by refusing to permit the expression by
the majority of its will.”93
II. COULD IT HAPPEN AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE?
A. The Federal Reserve’s Structure and Governance Makes a Similar
Fracas Unlikely
Like the FDIC, the Federal Reserve is a multimember regulatory
agency. Seven governors serve staggered, fourteen-year terms, and—
unlike the FDIC—none serve as the head of another agency.94 Also
unlike the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Act contains no partisan balance
requirement. Three of the seven governors are selected by the
President and confirmed by the Senate to serve four-year terms as
Chair, Vice Chair, and Vice Chair for Supervision congruent with their
terms as governors.95
The reasons why the fracas at the FDIC is unlikely to be replicated
at the Federal Reserve are several. First, the structure of the Federal
Reserve is quite different from the FDIC. Unlike the FDIC, the
Federal Reserve does not see a substantial minority of its members
immediately change party affiliation at the start of new presidential
administrations. Although most Federal Reserve governors do not
serve their full 14-year terms,96 it is unlikely that the majority party will
change as abruptly as at the FDIC while the Chair’s party remains the
same.97 There is less likely to be the “need” for a partisan majority to
override the minority-party Chair in order to effectuate their agenda.
92. Id. at 6–7.
93. Id. at 7 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARLIAMENTARY LAW § 8 (2022) (internal quotations
removed)).
94. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 241–42.
95. See id. § 242.
96. See Peter Conti-Brown, Restoring the Promise of Federal Reserve Governance 41 tbl.3
(Jan. 3, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Mercatus Center, George Mason
University), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/conti-brown-fed-governance-mercatus-workingpaper-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRJ6-FVNG] (finding the median tenure for a Federal Reserve
governor to be 5.18 years).
97. While a change in majority party but not the Chair’s party happened in 2022, this only
occurred because of a confluence of events: the prior administration left one opening for
President Biden to fill, one governor decided to resign at the end of 2021, and a third’s term
expired in January 2022. See Sylvan Lane, Biden Says He’ll Announce Fed Picks ‘Fairly Quickly’,
THE HILL (Nov. 11, 2021 4:54 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/579699-biden-says-hellannounce-fed-picks-fairly-quickly [https://perma.cc/LY6S-ULWB] (“Fed Vice Chairman Richard
Clarida’s stint as the board’s No. 2. runs out in January . . . and there is a vacant seat on the Fed
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Second, power at the Federal Reserve is at once both more
statutorily concentrated in the Chair and practically more diffuse than
at the FDIC. The Federal Reserve Act deems the Chair to be the
Federal Reserve’s “active executive officer”98 and provides that the
Chair “assign[s] . . . responsibility for the performance of any function
that the [Federal Reserve] determines to delegate,” such as delegations
to staff.99 Consequentially, unlike the FDIC, for which the role of the
Chair is not defined in statute, the Federal Reserve’s Chair maintains
statutory authority over staff activities. However, practice dictates that
policies are crafted by staff who report to various governors, rather
than the Chair.100 The Federal Reserve has eight policy committees,
each chaired by a governor. Unlike the FDIC, in which all staff in
practice report to the Chair, Federal Reserve staff report to the chairs
of the different policy committees.101 For example, the Federal
Reserve’s Division of Consumer and Community Affairs reports
directly to the Chair of the Committee on Consumer and Community
Affairs; the Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment
Systems reports to the Chair of the Committee on Federal Reserve
Bank Affairs;102 and following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the Division of Supervision and Regulation reports to the Vice Chair
for Supervision (VCS), a position which that statute created.103
Accordingly, the Chair sets the agendas for Board meetings, but only
after other governors have developed, reviewed, and fully ventilated
the items that are to receive a vote.
Third, the processes for decision-making at the Federal Reserve
are also quite different from those at the FDIC. Unlike the FDIC, the
board left unfilled by former President Trump.”); Sylvan Lane, Fed Governor Quarles to Step
Down, Opening Seat for Biden Pick, THE HILL (Nov. 8, 2021 11:33 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/580537-feds-quarles-to-step-down-in-december-opening-seatfor-biden-pick [https://perma.cc/QV7Z-PKUR] (“Federal Reserve Governor Randal Quarles
will resign from the central bank at the end of December.”).
98. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
99. See id. § 248(k).
100. See Brendan Pedersen & Hannah Lang, Sidelining of Quarles Complicates Fed’s
Policymaking, AM. BANKER (Oct. 14, 2021 3:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
sidelining-of-quarles-complicates-feds-policymaking [https://perma.cc/A6GQ-DTYH] (“‘The head
of the supervision and regulation committee at the Fed directs the supervision and regulation staff
and tells them what to work on, or what not to work on,’ said Todd Phillips.”).
101. See Board Members, FED. RSRV. BD. (last updated Sept. 30, 2022), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/default.htm [https://perma.cc/CU44-BE36].
102. See id.
103. See Kyle Campbell, Without a Supervision Chief at Fed, Full Board Owns Regulation,
AM. BANKER (Apr. 12, 2022, 1:05 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/quarles-fedneeds-vice-chair-to-take-the-heat-on-divisive-policies [https://perma.cc/6AG6-54N8].
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Federal Reserve has no bylaws governing Board decision-making that
allow associate governors to call votes. Instead, the Federal Reserve
Act provides that the Chair “shall preside” at board meetings.104 There
are minor regulations governing several Board activities,105 including
creating regulations106 and adjudicating a variety of applications,107 but
none detail how items are to be voted upon.108 A Freedom of
Information Act request to the Federal Reserve for bylaws, rules, or
legal opinions governing board meetings resulted in nothing that would
give associate governors agenda authority or the ability to circulate
items for notational vote.109
Accordingly, not only is it structurally unlikely that a majority of
Federal Reserve governors would wish to override the Chair, there also
does not appear to be any existing mechanism by which associate
governors may compel votes on items the Chair does not wish to place
on meeting agendas.110
B. If a Fracas Were To Occur, a Court May Find It Equitable To
Intervene
Of course, courts may find it equitable to intervene over questions
of Federal Reserve governance and find that associate governors have
104. 12 U.S.C. § 244.
105. See 12 C.F.R. § 262 (2021) (Rules of Procedure).
106. See id. § 262.2.
107. See id. § 262.3.
108. The Federal Reserve’s regulations also provide that “a majority of its members” is
“required to take action on behalf of the agency” except in three rare circumstances that require
an affirmative vote of more than a majority of the Board. Id. § 261b.2(d).
109. Response on file with author. See also Federal Reserve Vice Chair Nomination Hearing,
C-SPAN (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.c-span.org/video/?517105-1/federal-reserve-vice-chairconfirmation-hearing [https://perma.cc/B5BL-CYE9] (providing statement of Vice Chair Lael Brainard
that “the Chair determines what goes to the Board for votes” in response to a question from
Senator Hagerty).
110. Likely, if a majority of governors wished to take an action the Chair does not support,
the majority would state publicly that they would support taking an action, but the Chair will not
allow a vote to occur. While the President could demote the Chair and the Vice Chair could set
Board meeting agendas, see 12 U.S.C. § 242 (failing to provide for-cause removal protections for
governors serving as officers and providing that the Vice Chair “shall serve in the absence of the
Chairman”), or the Board could vote to make one of their own Acting Chair, see Press Release,
Fed. Rsrv. Bd., Federal Reserve Board Names Jerome H. Powell as Chair Pro Tempore, Pending
Senate Confirmation to a Second Term as Chair of the Board of Governors (Feb. 4, 2022),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20220204a.htm [https://perma.cc/
DFX4-ES7E] (noting that the Board “named Jerome H. Powell as Chair Pro Tempore, pending
Senate confirmation to a second term as Chair of the Board of Governors . . . [which] enables him
to continue to carry out his duties as Chair after the expiration of his term”), this author predicts
such an action would be unlikely to occur as it would roil financial markets to an unacceptable
extent.
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a right to agenda-setting authority. Federal courts follow a principle of
allowing “administrative agencies . . . ‘to fashion their own rules of
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
them to discharge their multitudinous duties.’”111 The reasoning behind
this principle is sensible: courts are understandably loath to interfere
in executive branch operations, not only because of separation of
powers concerns but also because procedures are necessary for the
smooth functioning of government.112 The Supreme Court has noted
that “administrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with
the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than
federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to
the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency
involved,”113 and a court’s involvement “clearly runs the ‘risk of
propel[ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside
exclusively for the administrative agency.’”114
This logic, while appropriate for instances in which agencies
decide how best to interact with regulated entities,115 should also apply
to situations in which a commission has written rules governing its
voting processes, even if those rules would inhibit a majority from
effectuating its will. In the case of the FDIC, although the bylaws in
question were not adapted to the peculiarities of banking, they were
adapted to the particularities of the FDIC. For example, having rules
for holding votes on uncontroversial topics by circulating materials is
rational given that two of the five directors lead separate agencies and
do not work in the same building as the others.
However, it is less clear that courts should avoid intervening when
an agency lacks rules governing how a commission votes and when
agenda-setting authority lies by default solely with the chair, as with
the Federal Reserve. Although courts lack a test for whether they

111. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
112. See, e.g., Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004) (“This tradition of
deference is rooted in the separation of powers, and the respect of the judiciary for the functions
of a coordinate branch of government.”).
113. Schreiber, 381 U.S. at 290.
114. Fed. Power Comm. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976) (quoting
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
115. See e.g., Schreiber, 381 U.S. at 280–81 (noting that the Court was asked to determine
whether an agency could “promulgate procedural standards for determining whether testimony
taken and documents produced during an investigatory proceeding should be accorded
confidential treatment”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1986)
(noting that EPA was free “to promulgate underground injection control regulations for Indian
lands”).
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should intervene to allow a commission majority to act by notational
vote when its chair stymies the majority’s will, decisions should be
based on whether Congress intended for the chair to have sole agenda
authority, and if indeterminate, whether Congress’s policy goals would
be better effectuated by granting agenda authority to all members of
the body.116
There may be some agencies for which Congress intended the
chair to have sole agenda authority, but it does not appear that the
Federal Reserve is one of them.117 The structure seems to suggest that
other Federal Reserve governors need some agenda authority to rein
in the power of the Chair. The Federal Reserve Act provides that the
seven governors—all presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed
officials—have (with a few exceptions) collective decision-making
authority.118 Further, because the Act provides that the Chair is the
agency’s chief executive but is subject to oversight by the Board,119 it
would be impossible for the other governors to place limitations on the
Chair’s executive actions if they could only vote on whatever the Chair
approved.
The legislative history also does not dispel the notion that
Congress would have wanted the Federal Reserve to be majority-ruled.
As enacted in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act made the Chair more
figurehead than leader and Congress intended for the Board as a whole
to make governing decisions.120 The Act originally provided that the
Board would consist of the Treasury Secretary and Comptroller of the
Currency as ex officio members and five additional members, with the
Treasury Secretary being Chair.121 Because of the difficulty in
managing two government agencies, the Act provided that another
116. See, e.g., OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 3 (opining that “[n]othing in the [FDI]
Act can be read as authorizing the Chairperson to prevent a majority of the Board from
presenting items to the Board for a vote and decision”).
117. For instance, because the Administrative Conference of the United States is governed
by a Council composed of one PAS Chair and 10 other members appointed by the President to
unpaid part-time positions, it is logical for the Chair to set meeting agendas. 5 U.S.C. §§ 593(b)–
(c), 595(b).
118. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 248 (authorizing and empowering “[t]he Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System” to undertake specific enumerated actions).
119. See id. § 242 (“The Chairman of the Board, subject to its supervision, shall be its active
executive officer.”).
120. See generally 50 CONG. REC. 5997 (1913) (“[T]he power to permit the banks to count as
reserves the national-bank notes and the Federal reserve notes, we propose to put into the hands
of the Federal reserve board . . . .”); id. at 5998 (“The Federal reserve board even has the power
to remove the directors of the Federal reserve banks . . . .”); id. at 6018 (“[T]he Federal reserve
board shall issue the currency which the needs of the business require . . . .”).
121. Federal Reserve Act § 10, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251, 260–61 (1913).
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Board member—designated “Governor” by the President—would be
the Federal Reserve’s “active executive officer.”122 According to a
committee report,
In designating the Secretary of the Treasury as ex officio chairman of
the [Federal Reserve] the bill aims to preserve the general concept of
official responsibility and duty which is fundamental to the
conception of the board. In ordinary times the Secretary of the
Treasury’s relation to the board would be largely formal. In times of
stress or sudden danger he might become an active and effective
working member of the board.123

Congress’s intention may have been for the Governor to run the
agency while the Treasury Secretary maintained the ordinary flow of
business during Board meetings.124
In 1935, Congress removed the Treasury Secretary and
Comptroller from the Federal Reserve Board and provided, instead,
that the individual selected to be the active executive officer by the
President would also serve as Chair.125 From committee hearings and
reports, it does not appear that Congress intended for the role of the
Board itself to change.
The legislative history for the next legislative change to the Board
demonstrates that Congress then knew the power of the Chair vis-à-vis
other governors but, again, does not appear to have contemplated a
change in the role of the Board. A 1977 congressional committee
122. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 63-69, at 44 (1913) (noting that designation of Governor by
the President was “wiser than to throw upon so small a board the duty of selecting executive
officers from among its own membership”).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 63-69, at 44 (1913).
124. In practice, it appears that the Treasury Secretary may not actually have attended many
meetings yet nevertheless used his position to wield power over the Board. See 1 ALLAN H.
MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1913–1951 4 (2003) (“Before the 1930s,
treasury secretaries rarely participated actively.”); W. P. G. HARDING, THE FORMATIVE PERIOD
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (DURING THE WORLD CRISIS) 7–10 (1925) (noting that
Treasury Secretary McAdoo desired for the Board to be a bureau of the Treasury Department
and, accordingly, worked to undermine it); Banking Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1715 & H. R. 7617
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 74th Cong. 90 (1935) (stating that
as Treasury Secretary “I would not say in an offensive way that I dominated the Board, but I, at
least, had considerable influence with the action of the Board, and I have suspected . . . that
frequently since the Secretary of the Treasury has had too much influence upon the Board”)
(statement of Sen. Carter Glass); id. at 930 (noting that as Treasury Secretary “I was able to attend
in the beginning almost every meeting, and was glad to attend,” but later “found it impossible to
attend the meetings of the Board” as World War I broke out) (statement of Sen. McAdoo).
125. See Banking Act of 1935 § 203(b), Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684, 705 (“Of the persons
thus appointed, one shall be designated by the President as chairman . . . to serve as such for a
term of four years. The chairman of the Board, subject to its supervision, shall be its active
executive officer.”).

2022]

THE FRACAS AT THE FDIC

81

report recognized that “the President can designate as Chairman
someone who may have been confirmed by the Senate years earlier
and is not questioned again, even though he or she is assuming a
position far more important than the one to which he or she was
confirmed,”126 and the Chair of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs said in a hearing that “we know the great
power and influence, psychological and actual, [of] the chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. He’s one of the top economic officials in our
Government, along with the Secretary of the Treasury.”127 Yet being a
top economic official does not mean that the other governors should
not be able to override the Chair.128
Lastly, with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,
Congress created the one position on the Federal Reserve that may
hold a claim to agenda authority beside the Chair: the Vice Chair for
Supervision (VCS). That Act provides that the VCS “shall develop
policy recommendations for the Board regarding supervision and
regulation of depository institution holding companies and other
financial firms supervised by the Board, and shall oversee the
supervision and regulation of such firms.”129 Given that there have
been only two VCSs in history (Randal Quarles served one term from
2017–21, and Michael Barr started in July 2022),130 it has not been
litigated whether the VCS may compel all governors to vote on their
policy recommendations. In a congressional hearing, Chair Powell
indicated that he would “respect the authority [of the VCS] to bring

126. H.R. REP. NO. 95-559, at 6 (1977).
127. Federal Reserve Reform and Audit: Hearings on S. 2285 & S. 2509 Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 94th Cong. 136 (1975) (statement of Chairman William
Proxmire); see also Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 8094 Before the H.
Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urb. Affs., 95th Cong. 4 (1977) (“[T]he President can designate as
Chairman someone who was confirmed by the Senate some 13 years previously, yet the Senate
be powerless to confirm the appointee to what was recently called the Nation’s ‘No. 2 position.’”)
(statement of Chairman Henry S. Reuss).
128. Congress decided to make the Chair more accountable to Congress by requiring the
President’s selection of Chair to be confirmed by the Senate. See Federal Reserve Reform Act of
1977 § 204, Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387, 1388 (1977).
129. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
130. See Board of Governors Members, 1914–Present, FED. RSRV. BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm [https://perma.cc
/7E5C-5893] (explaining that Quarles served from Oct. 13, 2017 to Oct. 13, 2021, and Barr began
service July 19, 2022).
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these proposals,” but “they will still have to convince the members of
the Board to vote for whatever that person is proposing.”131
If the legislative history were not sufficient (and, arguably, what is
described above is simplified), a court should examine the proper role
of commission chairs generally—though this is a question that has not
been answered by Congress or by academic literature. There are two
principal and contrasting views. The first view is that, by virtue of
setting meeting agendas and directing agency staff, chairs should also
set agency agendas. Chairs are selected as leaders of their commissions,
either by the President (sometimes with Senate approval) or by a vote
of the commissioners themselves, and this leadership should manifest
in agenda-setting authority. In other words, a majority should be
permitted to restrain the agency from acting but not to spur the agency
to action. Further supporting this view is that giving chairs selected by
the President sole agenda authority facilitates the President’s control
over the executive branch and supports the logic undergirding the
unitary executive theory.132 Former FDIC Chair McWilliams was a
proponent of this view, arguing during the fracas that the Democratic
directors’ efforts were “an attempt to wrest control from an
independent agency’s chairman” and implying that she alone had the
rightful authority to dictate which items received a vote.133
The second view is that chairs should facilitate effective decisionmaking of the commission as a whole, presiding over meetings as
“traffic conductors” that allow a majority to effectively make decisions
even if a chair disagrees with a majority.134 In those agencies for which
members are presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed, allowing
one of several equals to block the majority appears facially unfair: the
role of associate commissioners should not be to simply ratify or reject
the proposals of the chair, but to be equal participants in the act of
governing. It also cuts against Congress’s intention to ensure a diversity
131. Treasury Secretary and Federal Reserve Chair Testify on CARES Act Oversight, C-SPAN
(Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.c-span.org/video/?516333-1/treasury-secretary-federal-reserve-chair
-testify-cares-act-oversight [https://perma.cc/78M3-VNG7] (statement of Jerome Powell).
132. See Phillips, supra note 10 (studying authorities of commission chairs and explaining that
the strong-chair model may support the unitary executive theory).
133. McWilliams, supra note 3.
134. There is very little literature or case law on the intended role of chief executives in
private sector corporations. However, board “chairs are often seen as facilitating the effective
processing of information at the board table via their role in developing and overseeing the
agenda, ensuring directors are informed and participating, conducting the board meeting as well
as keeping track of decisions and their implementation.” Pieter-Jan Bezemer, Gavin Nicholson,
& Amedeo Pugliese, The Influence of Board Chairs on Director Engagement: A Case-Based
Exploration of Boardroom Decision-Making, 26 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 219, 220 (2018).
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of views and that no individual alone can make decisions.135 Lastly,
because commissions’ chief executives are largely to be “governed by
general policies of” their commissions,136 associate commissioners
cannot effectively oversee the chief executive’s activities when that
individual is also chair and can prevent the majority from acting.
The second view is more persuasive, and OLC agrees.137 OLC has
noted that, “against the backdrop of the majority-rule principle,” a
commission majority may call a special meeting without the ascent of
the chair138 and that, in instances in which a statute “is silent as to a
commission’s internal organization, practices, and procedures [,] [t]he
clear implication is that these matters are to be decided by the members
of the [c]ommission.”139 OLC also explains that, much as “a president
and CEO of a corporation [may] possess substantial authority over
corporate affairs, such authority exists largely as a matter of the board’s
grace and does not deprive the board of its ultimate authority to
manage corporate business,” the same is true for government
commissions.140 “[S]etting the agenda is distinct from the authority to
block the will of a Board majority.”141
Simply because the second view is more persuasive, however, does
not mean that courts will undoubtedly agree with it; courts need not
defer to OLC opinions,142 and they could decide that supporting the
unitary executive theory may be a higher priority for the courts than
ensuring commissions are governed in ways that promote equal
135. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Johnjerica Hodge & Wesley W. Wintermyer, Partisan
Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 962–72 (2015)
(detailing congressional debates over the inclusion of partisan balance requirements in various
multimember regulatory agencies).
136. See, e.g., Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950 § 1(b)(1), 15 F.R. 3175 (providing that the
Chair of the Federal Trade Commission “shall be governed by general policies of the Commission
and by such regulatory decisions, findings, and determinations as the Commission may by law be
authorized to make”).
137. See Phillips, supra note 10 (recommending legislative changes to allow associate
commissioners to more easily oversee their chief executives and participate in policymaking).
138. Auth. Advisory Bd. for Cuba Broad. to Act in the Absence of a Presidentially
Designated Chairperson, 24 Op. O.L.C. 24, 26 (2000) (citing Letter from Larry L. Simms, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., to Mason H. Rose V, Chairperson, U.S. Architectural
and Transp. Barriers Compliance Bd. (Sept. 17, 1981)).
139. Nat’l Comm’n on Neighborhoods (Pub. L. 95-24) — Powers — Appropriations, 2 Op.
O.L.C. 366, 367 n.5 (1977).
140. Div. of Powers and Responsibilities Between the Chairperson of the Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Bd. and the Bd. as a Whole, 24 Op. O.L.C. 102, 107 (2000).
141. OLC FDIC Opinion, supra note 68, at 8.
142. See generally Sonia Mittal, OLC’s Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the Office of Legal
Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2015) (describing the weight that courts give to OLC
opinions).
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participation among their members or that the lack of specifics in
statute means that past practice should control. But, if the Supreme
Court can look to principles of equity and common law rules to declare
that a commission majority may act on its behalf143 or that only a
majority of a quorum is necessary to act,144 then courts could rule that
associate commissioner agenda authority exists. Accordingly, were a
fracas at the Federal Reserve to occur, no matter how unlikely, it is at
least plausible that a court could find that a majority at the Federal
Reserve may act by notational vote.
CONCLUSION
Although unprecedented, the fracas at the FDIC was not simply a
might-makes-right, majority-rules power struggle. The abnormal
makeup of the FDIC’s Board was such that half of its membership
changed party affiliation on the first day of new presidential
administrations. Further, the FDIC’s bylaws provided a legal avenue
for the Democratic directors to vote on the RFI, and those bylaws
appear to have been properly followed. Despite concern of some
Senate Republicans, the Federal Reserve is unlikely to have a similar
transition at the beginning of new presidential terms, is not governed
by similar procedural rules, and, thus, a majority of Federal Reserve
governors cannot use a similar maneuver to bypass the Chair.
However, if the issue is litigated, there is a chance that a court
could rule that the Federal Reserve should be governed by a rule that
allows for a majority to act without the acquiescence of the Chair. It
does not appear that Congress intended for the Federal Reserve Chair
to have the agenda setting authority that he now has, and a core
principle of multimember bodies is that one of several equals should
not be permitted to block the majority. Further, the Supreme Court
has previously ruled on issues of commission governance based neither
in agency rules or statute but in equity and common law, and they could
do so again.
The validity of notational voting is just one of many governance
issues that commissions face for which courts have not yet ruled.
143. See Cooley v. O’Connor, 79 U.S. 391, 397 (1871) (“[A]n authority given to several for
public purposes may be executed by a majority of their number.”).
144. See Brown v. D.C., 127 U.S. 579, 586 (1888) (“[A] major part of the whole is necessary
to constitute a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as
to leave no quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease.”) (quoting
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 296 § 283 (3d ed. 1881));
FTC v. Flotill Prods., 389 U.S. 179, 183 (1967) (“[A] majority of a quorum constituted of a simple
majority of a collective body is empowered to act for the body.”).
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Commission governance is fraught with challenges, and courts will
doubtlessly be called on to adjudicate complex disputes involving
power dynamics.

